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Abstract6
We consider an infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma under costly observation.7
Players choose whether to observe the opponent or not after they choose their actions.8
If a player observes the opponent, he pays a small observation cost and he can observe9
the action chosen by his opponent in that period. Otherwise, he receives no signal or an10
inaccurate private signal. First, we prove an efficiency result that players can achieve a11
symmetric nearly Pareto efficient outcome. Then, we extend the idea with an interim12
public randomization device, which is realized just after players choose actions. Players13
can decide their observational decision after they see the interim public randomization14
device. We present a folk theorem for a sufficiently small observation cost when players15
are sufficiently patient.16
Keywords Costly observation; Efficiency; Folk theorem; Prisoner’s dilemma17
JEL Classification: C72; C73; D8218
1 Introduction19
A standard insight in the theory of repeated games is that repetition enables players to20
obtain collusive and efficient outcomes. However, a common and important assumption21
behind such results is that the players in the repeated game can monitor each other’s past22
behavior without any cost. We analyze an infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma game where23
each player can only observe his opponent’s previous action at a (small) cost after they24
choose actions. We establish an approximate efficient result. Then, we introduce an interim25
public randomization device, which is realized just after they choose actions, and show an26
approximate folk theorem.27
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In our model, we consider costly observation as a monitoring structure. Each player1
chooses his action, and then he makes an observational decision. If a player chooses to observe2
his opponent, then he can observe the action chosen by the opponent. The observational3
decision itself is unobservable. The player receives extremely inaccurate private signal.4
Furthermore, no player can statistically identify the observational decision of his oppo-5
nent. That is, our monitoring structure is neither almost-public private monitoring (Ho¨rner6
and Olszewski (2009); Mailath and Morris (2002, 2006); Mailath and Olszewski (2011)), nor7
almost perfect private monitoring (Bhaskar and Obara (2002); Chen (2010); Ely and Va¨lima¨ki8
(2002); Ely et al. (2005); Ho¨rner and Olszewski (2006); Sekiguchi (1997); Piccione (2002);9
Yamamoto (2007, 2009))10
We present two results. First, we show that the symmetric Pareto efficient payoff vector11
can be approximated by a sequential equilibrium under some assumptions regarding the12
payoff matrix when players are patient and the observation cost is small (efficiency). This13
first result shows that collusive outcomes can be approximated if it is symmetric. The14
second result is an approximate folk theorem. We introduce an interim public randomization15
device just after players choose actions. Players can see the public randomization before they16
choose their observational decisions. We present an approximate folk theorem under some17
assumptions regarding the payoff matrix when players are patient and the observation cost is18
small. We also show that a (standard) public randomization device which is realized at the19
end of stage game does not work instead of the interim public randomization device. This20
second result shows that any collusive outcomes can be approximated if an interim public21
randomization device is available.22
The nature of our strategy is similar to the keep-them-guessing strategies in Chen (2010).23
In our strategy, each player i chooses Ci with certainty at the cooperation state, but random-24
izes the observational decision. Depending on the observation result, players change their25
actions from the next period. If the player plays Ci and observes Cj, he remains in a cooper-26
ation state. However, in other cases (for example, the player does not observe his opponent),27
player i moves out of the cooperation state and chooses Di. From the perspective of player j,28
player i plays the game as if he randomizes Ci and Di, even though player i chooses pure29
actions in each state. Such randomized observations create uncertainty about the opponents’30
state in each period and give an incentive to observe.31
Our main contribution is the efficiency result and an approximate folk theorem in an32
infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma. Some previous studies show that the efficiency result33
holds if communication or private signals are available. For example, Miyagawa et al. (2008)34
assume that some noisy information is available even if players do not observe their opponent.35
We discuss previous studies in Section 2. Our efficiency result holds in the least stringent36
setting compared with other studies.37
Another contribution of the paper is a new approach to the construction of a sequential38
equilibrium. We consider randomization of observation, whereas previous studies confine39
their attention to randomization of actions. In many cases, the observational decision is40
supposed to be unobservable in costly observation models. Therefore, even if a player ob-41
serves his opponent, he cannot know whether the opponent observes him. If the continuation42
strategy of the opponent depends on the observational decision in the previous period, the43
opponent might randomize actions from the perspective of the player, even though the op-44
ponent chooses pure actions in each history. This new approach enables us to construct a45
nontrivial sequential equilibrium.46
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss previous studies,47
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and in Section 2.1, we focus on some previous literature and explain some difficulties in1
constructing a cooperative relationship in an infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma under2
costly observation. Section 3 introduces a repeated prisoner’s dilemma model with costly3
observation. In Section 4, we present our efficiency result. For efficiency result, we do not4
utilize an interim public randomization device. After that, applying the efficiency result,5
we present a folk theorem with an interim public randomization device. Section 5 provides6
concluding remarks.7
2 Literature Review8
We review previous studies on repeated games under costly observation.9
One of the greatest difficulties in costly observation is observing the observation activity10
of opponents, because observational behavior under costly observation is often assumed to be11
unobservable. Each player has to check this unobservable observation behavior to motivate12
the other player to observe. Some previous studies circumvent the difficulty by assuming that13
the observational decision is observable. Kandori and Obara (2004) and Lehrer and Solan14
(2018) assume that players can observe other players’ observational decisions.15
Ben-Porath and Kahneman (2003) analyze an information acquisition model with com-16
munication. They show that players can share their information through explicit communica-17
tion, and present a folk theorem for any level of observation cost. Ben-Porath and Kahneman18
(2003) consider randomizing actions on the equilibrium path. In their strategy, players re-19
port their observations to each other. Then, each player can check whether the other player20
observes him by the reports. Therefore, players can check the observation activities of other21
players.22
Miyagawa et al. (2008) consider that communication is not allowed, but players can obtain23
imperfect private signals about the other player’s action even when they do not observe their24
opponent. They show that players can communicate with each other using private signals,25
and present a folk theorem for any level of observation cost.26
Another approach is introduction of nonpublic randomization device to infinitely repeated27
prisoner’s dilemma. The nonpublic randomization device enables players to correlate their28
actions. Hino (2019) shows that if a nonpublic randomization device is available before players29
choose their actions and observational decisions, then players can achieve an efficiency result.30
If these assumptions do not hold, that is, if costless information is unavailable, then31
cooperation is difficult. Two other papers present folk theorems without costless information.32
Flesch and Perea (2009) consider observation structures similar to our structure. In their33
model, players can purchase the information about the actions taken in the past if the players34
incur an additional cost. That is, some organization keeps track of all the sequence of the35
action profiles, and each player can purchase the information from the organization. Flesch36
and Perea (2009) present a folk theorem for an arbitrary observation cost. Miyagawa et al.37
(2003) consider less stringent models. They assume that no organization keeps track of all38
the sequence of the action profiles for players. Players can observe the opponent’s action39
in the current period, and cannot purchase the information about the actions in the past.40
Therefore, if a player wants to keep track of actions chosen by the opponent, he has to pay41
observation cost every period. This observation structure is the same as the one in the current42
paper. Miyagawa et al. (2003) present a folk theorem with a small observation cost.43
The above two studies, Flesch and Perea (2009) and Miyagawa et al. (2003), consider44
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communication through mixed actions. To communicate with each other by mixed actions,1
the above two papers need more than two actions for each player. This means that their2
approach cannot be applied to infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma under costly. We discuss3
their implicit communication in Miyagawa et al. (2003); Flesch and Perea (2009) in Section 2.14
in more detail.5
It is an open question of whether players can achieve an efficiency result and a folk6
theorem in two-action games, even though the observation cost is sufficiently small. We7
show an efficiency result without any randomization device using a mixed observation rather8
than mixed actions when observation cost is small. We will extend the efficiency result using9
public randomization, and present a folk theorem in infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma10
when observation cost is small.11
2.1 Cooperation failure in the prisoner’s dilemma (Miyagawa et al.12
(2003))13
Consider the bilateral trade game with moral hazard in Bhaskar and van Damme (2002)14
simplified by Miyagawa et al. (2003).15
Player 2
C2 D2 E2
Player 1
C1 1 , 1 −1 , 2 −1 , −1
D1 2 , −1 0 , 0 −1 , −1
E1 −1 , −1 −1 , −1 0 , 0
Table 1: Extended prisoner’s dilemma
Players choose whether he observes the opponent or not together with his action choice.16
Miyagawa et al. (2003) consider the following keep-them-guessing automaton strategy to17
approximate payoff vector (1, 1). There are three states: cooperation, punishment, and18
defection.19
In the cooperation state, each player chooses Ci with a sufficiently high probability and20
chooses Di with the remaining probability. Players observe their opponent irrespective of21
their actions in the cooperation state. If players observe (C1, C2) or (D1, D2), the state22
remains the same. When (C1, D2) or (D1, C2) is realized, the state moves to the punishment23
state. The state moves to the defection state if player i chooses Ei or observes Ej. In the24
punishment state, both players choose Ei for some periods, and then the state moves back25
to a cooperation state. In the defection state, both players choose Ei, and the state remains26
the same. In both the punishment state and the defection state, the players do not observe27
their opponent.28
Players have an incentive to observe their opponent because their opponent randomizes29
actions Cj and Dj in the cooperation state. If a player does not observe their opponent,30
the player cannot know in which state the opponent is in the next period. If the opponent31
is in the cooperation state, action Ei is a suboptimal because the opponent never chooses32
action Ej. That is, choosing action Ei has some opportunity cost because the opponent33
is in the cooperation state with a positive probability. However, if the opponent is the34
punishment state, then action Ei is a unique optimal action. Choosing actions Ci or Di35
also has opportunity costs because the opponent is in the punishment state with a positive36
probability. To avoid these opportunity costs, players have an incentive to observe.37
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These ideas do not hold in two-action games. Suppose that action Ei is not available1
and consider the prisoner’s dilemma as an example. If players randomize Ci and Di in2
the cooperation state, then one of the best response actions in the cooperation state is3
action Di. The best response action in punishment and defection states is also Di. As a4
result, irrespective of player i’s observation result, one of the optimal continuation strategies5
is choosing Di and not observe player j every period. Therefore, Players don’t have an6
incentive to observe.7
I consider the following automaton strategy. In the initial state, player i randomizes8
actions and observe the opponent with a positive probability only when he chooses Ci. If he9
chooses Ci and observes Cj, he moves to the cooperation state in the next period. Otherwise,10
he moves to the defection state.1 In the cooperation state, player i chooses action Ci with11
probability one, but randomizes observational decision. Only if player i chooses Ci and12
observes Cj, player i can remain in the cooperation state. Otherwise, player i moves to the13
defection state.14
The reason why our strategy works is that the strategy prescribes pure action of Ci and15
does not prescribe a mixed actions in the cooperation state. The repetition of Di from the16
cooperation state is not prescribed action. However, it causes another problem related to the17
observation incentive. As player j does not randomize his action in the cooperation state,18
player i can easily guess player j’s action if he knows that player j is in the cooperation state.19
In such a situation, player i loses the observation incentive again.20
Our strategy can overcome this difficulty as well. Since player j randomize his obser-21
vational decisions in the cooperation state, player i in the cooperation state cannot know22
whether player j observed player i or not. If player j does not observes player i, player j23
moves to the defection state and chooses Dj. Player i cannot be certain that player j is24
in the cooperation state even if he chooses Ci and observes Cj in the previous period. To25
obtain the latest information about player j’s state, player i has an incentive to observe the26
opponent in the cooperation state. This is why player i has an incentive to observe player j27
given our strategy.28
3 Model29
The stage game is a symmetric prisoner’s dilemma, but it has two phases: the action phase30
and the observation phase. In the action phase, each player i (i = 1, 2) chooses an action,31
Ci or Di. Let Ai ≡ {Ci, Di} be the set of actions for player i. After both players chooses32
actions, each player i receives a signal zi costlessly and privately. The set of private signal33
for player i is finite set and denoted by Zi. A signal profile z = (z1, z2) =∈ Z ≡ Z1 × Z2 is34
realized with probability ρ(z|a) given an action profile a = (a1, a2) ∈ A ≡ A1 × A2.35
Assumption 1. There exists some ζ > 0 such that36
ρ(z|a) > ζ, ∀z ∈ Z, ∀a ∈ A.
We define the accuracy ηi of the signal zi as follows.37
ηi ≡1− min
zi∈Zi,a,a′∈A
ρ(zi|a
′)
ρ(zi|a)
.
1For the formal proof, we need another state (transition state). Transition state is crucial only when we
consider off the equilibrium path. Therefore, it is omitted here.
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The base game payoff for player i is given by πi(ai, zi). Given an action profile a ∈ A, an1
expected base game payoff for player i, ui(a) ≡ Σzi∈ZiP (zi|a)πi(ai, zi), is displayed in Table 2.2
Player 2
C2 D2
Player 1
C1 1 , 1 −ℓ , 1 + g
D1 1 + g, −ℓ 0 , 0
Table 2: Prisoner’s dilemma
3
We make a usual assumption about the above payoff matrix.4
Assumption 2. (i) g > 0 and ℓ > 0; (ii) g − ℓ < 1.5
The first condition implies that action Ci is dominated by action Di for each player i, and the6
second condition ensures that the payoff vector of action profile (C1, C2) is Pareto efficient.7
We impose an additional assumption.8
Assumption 3. g − ℓ > 0.9
Assumption 3 is the same as Assumption 1 in Chen (2010).10
Players simultaneously choose their observational decision in the observation phase after11
they choose their actions in the action phase. Let mi represent the observational decision12
for player i. Let Mi ≡ {0, 1} be the set of observational decisions for player i, where mi = 113
represents “to observe the opponent,” and mi = 0 represents “not to observe the opponent.”14
If player i observes the opponent, he incurs an observation cost λ > 0, and receives complete15
information about the action chosen by the opponent at the end of the stage game. If16
player i does not observe the opponent, he does not incur any observation cost and obtains17
no information about his opponent’s action. We assume that the observational decision for18
a player is unobservable.19
A stage behavior for player i is a pair of base game action ai for player i and observational20
decision mi for player i and is denoted by bi = (ai,mi). An outcome of the stage game is a21
pair of stage behaviors b = (b1, b2). Let Bi ≡ Ai×Mi be the set of stage-behaviors for player i,22
and let B ≡ B1 × B2 be the set of outcomes of the stage game. Given an outcome b ∈ B,23
the stage game payoff πi(b) for player i is given by24
Ui(b) ≡ ui(a1, a2)−mi · λ.
For any observation cost λ > 0, the stage game has a unique stage game Nash equilibrium25
outcome, b∗ = ((D1, 0), (D2, 0)).26
Let δ ∈ (0, 1) be a common discount factor. Players maximize their expected average27
discounted stage game payoffs. Given a sequence of outcomes of the stage games (bt)∞t=1,28
player i’s payoff is given by average discounted stage game payoff:29
(1− δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1Ui(b
t).
Player i’s nonaveraged payoff is given by:30
∞∑
t=1
δt−1Ui(b
t).
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We assume that an interim public randomization device is available just before players1
choose their observational decisions. The random variable X is uniformly distributed over2
[0, 1) independently of the action profile. Each player observes the realized public random-3
ization without any cost.4
Let oi ∈ Aj ∪ {ϕi} be an observation result for player i. Observation result oi = aj ∈ Aj5
implies that player i chose observational decision mi = 1 and observed aj. Observation6
result oi = ϕi implies that player i chose mi = 0, that is, he obtains no information about7
the action chosen by the opponent.8
Let hti be a (private) history of player i at the beginning of the action phase in pe-9
riod t ≥ 2. This history hti is a sequence of his own actions, realized public randomizations,10
observation results, and private signals up to period t− 1: hti = (a
k
i , x
k, oki , z
k
i )
t−1
k=1. We omit11
the observational decisions mki (k < t) from h
t
i because observation result o
k
i implies the ob-12
servational decision mki for any k < t. Let H
t
i denote the set of all the histories for player i13
at the beginning of the action phase in period t ≥ 1, where H1i is an arbitrary singleton set.14
Similarly, a history hˆti at the beginning of the observation phase in period t ≥ 1 is (h
t
i, a
t
i, x
t).15
An action strategy for player i in the repeated game is a function of the history hti of16
player i in the action phase to his (mixed) actions. An observation strategy for player i17
in the repeated game is a function of a history hˆti in the observation phase to his (mixed)18
observational decision. A (behavior) strategy is a pair of action strategy and observation19
strategy.20
The belief ψti of player i in period t is a function of the history h
t
i in period t to a21
probability distribution over the set of histories for player j in period t; H tj . Let ψi ≡ (ψ
t
i)
∞
t=122
be a belief for player i, and ψ = (ψ1, ψ2) denote a system of beliefs.23
A strategy profile σ is a pair of strategies σ1 and σ2. Given a strategy profile σ, a sequence24
of completely mixed behavior strategy profiles (σn)∞n=1 that converges to σ is called a tremble.25
Each completely mixed behavior strategy profile σn induces a unique system of beliefs ψn.26
The solution concept is a sequential equilibrium. We say that a system of beliefs ψ is27
consistent with strategy profile σ if a tremble (σn)∞n=1 exists such that the corresponding28
sequence of systems of beliefs (ψn)∞n=1 converges to ψ. Given the system of beliefs ψ, strategy29
profile σ is sequentially rational if, for each player i, the continuation strategy from any30
history in each phase is optimal given his belief and the opponent’s strategy. It is defined31
that a strategy profile σ is a sequential equilibrium if a consistent system of beliefs ψ for32
which σ is sequentially rational exists.33
4 Results34
In this section, we show our efficiency result. Then, applying the efficiency result, we present35
a folk theorem with an interim public randomization device.36
To prove the desired propositions, first, we assume η1 = η2 = 0. It means that a player37
obtains no information about the action of the opponent if he does not observe the opponent.38
We present related propositions given η1 = η2 = 0. After that, we will show the desired39
propositions using the related propositions.40
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4.1 Efficiency1
The following proposition shows that the symmetric efficient outcome is approximated by a2
sequential equilibrium if the observation cost λ is small and the discount factor δ is moderately3
low.4
Proposition 1. Suppose that η1 = η2 = 0, Assumptions 2 and 3 are satisfied. For any ε > 0,5
there exist δ ∈
(
g
1+g
, 1
)
, δ ∈ (δ, 1), and λ > 0 such that for any discount factor δ ∈ [δ, δ] and6
for any observation cost λ ∈ (0, λ), there exists a symmetric sequential equilibrium σ∗ whose7
payoff vector (v∗1, v
∗
2) satisfies v
∗
i ≥ 1− ε for each i = 1, 2.8
Proof. See Appendix A.9
We here present the main idea. The precise proof will be give in Appendix A.10
Strategy11
First, we define our strategy σ∗. Fix any ε > 0. We define ε, δ, δ, and λ as follows.12
ε ≡
ℓ2
54(1 + 2g)3
ε
1 + ε
,
δ ≡
g
1 + g
+ ε,
δ ≡
g
1 + g
+ 2ε < 1,
λ ≡
1
16
ℓ
(1 + 2g)2
ε2.
We fix an arbitrary discount factor δ ∈ [δ, δ] and an arbitrary observation cost λ ∈ (0, λ).13
Our strategy σ∗ is represented by an automaton independently of private signal z. Let us14
consider the following automaton who has four types of states: initial state ω1i , cooperation15
state (ωC,ti )
∞
t=2, transition state (ω
E,t
i )
∞
t=2, and defection state ω
D
i . In the initial state ω
1
i ,16
player i chooses Di with probability βi,1, and chooses Ci with probability 1 − βi,1.
2When17
player i chooses Ci, he observes the opponent with probability 1−βi,2. Player i never observes18
the opponent when player i chooses Di. In the cooperation state ω
C,t
i (t ≥ 2), player i chooses19
Ci. If player i chooses Ci, he chooses mi = 1 with probability 1 − βi,t+1. When player i20
chooses Di, he never observes the opponent. In the transition state ω
E,t
i (t ≥ 2) and defection21
state ωDi , player i chooses Di and does not observe the opponent irrespective of his action.22
The prescribed actions and observational decisions are summarized in the table below.23
State ω1i ω
C,t
i ω
E,t
i ω
D
i
Action
Ci w.p. 1− βi,1
Di w.p. βi,1
Ci Di Di
mi given Ci
mi = 1 w.p. 1− βi,2
mi = 0 w.p. βi,2
mi = 1 w.p. 1− βi,t+1
mi = 0 w.p. βi,t+1
mi = 0 mi = 0
mi given Di mi = 0
Table 3: Actions and observational decisions
2The probability βi,t(t ≥ 1) will be defined using (1) and (2) later.
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The state transition function is defined as follows. In the initial state ω1i , if player i1
observes (ati, o
t
i) = (Ci, Cj), he moves to the cooperation state ω
C,2
i . When player i chooses Di2
or observes Dj, the state in the next period is ω
D
i . Only when player i observes (a
t
i, o
t
i) =3
(Ci, ϕi), the state moves to the transition state ω
E,2
i . In the cooperation state and transition4
state in period t, player i moves to the cooperation state ωC,t+1i if he observes (a
t
i, o
t
i) =5
(Ci, Cj). If (a
t
i, o
t
i) = (Ci, ϕi), he moves to the transition state ω
E,t+1
i . If player i chooses Di6
or observes Dj, the state moves to the defection state ω
D
i . Note that player i moves back7
to the cooperation state ωC,t+1i from the transition state in period t if he observes (Ci, Cj),8
which is the event off the equilibrium path. The defection state ωDi is an absorbing state and9
player i never moves to another state from the defection state ωDi .10
The state transition is summarized in Figure 1.11
ω1i ω
C,2
i ω
C,3
i ω
C,t
i ω
C,t+1
i
(Ci, Cj) (Ci, Cj)
. . .
(Ci, Cj)
ωDi ω
E,2
i ω
E,t
i
. . . ωE,ti ω
E,t+1
i
(Ci, ϕi) (Ci, ϕi)
(Ci, ϕi) (Ci, ϕi) (Ci, ϕi)
(Ci, Cj) (Ci, Cj)
If player i chooses Di or observes Dj in any state, the state moves to ω
D
i .
Figure 1: State transition function
Using the above automaton, we fix randomization probabilities in each state. Let us12
define ε′ ≡ δ − g
1+g
. First, we fix a small probability βi,1 ≡
1+g+ℓ
g+ℓ
ε′. We fix a probability βi,213
so that player j is indifferent between actions Cj and Dj in the initial state ω
1
j . Hence, βi,214
is determined as the solution of the following equality.15
(1− βi,1)(1 + g) = (1− βi,1) · 1− βi,1 · ℓ+ δ(1− βi,1)(1− βi,2)(1 + g). (1)
The left-side is the nonaveraged payoff when player j chooses (a1j ,m
1
j) = (Dj, 0) in the initial16
state ω1j . The right-side is the one when player j chooses (a
1
j ,m
1
j) = (Cj, 0).17
Probability βi,t+2(t ≥ 1) is determined to make player j in state ω
C,t
j indifferent between18
mj = 1 and mj = 0 given his action Cj. Player j believes that player i is in the cooperation19
state with probability 1 − βi,t because he observes Cj in the previous period and he is sure20
that player j was in the cooperation state ωC,t−1j in the previous period t − 1. Therefore,21
probability βi,t+2 is a solution of the following equality.22
δ(1− βi,t)(1− βi,t+1)(1 + g)
=(1− βi,t) · 1− βi,t · ℓ− λ
+ δ(1− βi,t) {(1− βi,t+1) · 1− βi,t+1 · ℓ+ δ(1− βi,t+1)(1− βi,t+2)(1 + g)} (2)
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The left-side is the nonaveraged payoff when player j chooses mj = 0 in period t. The right-1
side is the one when player j chooses mj = 1 in period t and chooses (Cj, 0) if he is in the2
cooperation state ωC,t+1j in period t+ 1.3
Specifically, βi,2 is defined by (1), and βi,t+2 (t ∈ N) is defined by (2), or4
βi,2 =
(1− βi,1) {δ(1 + g)− g} − βi,1ℓ
δ(1− βi,1)(1 + g)
=
g + g2 − ℓ2 − (1 + g + ℓ)(1 + g)ε′
(g + ℓ) {g + (1 + g)ε′}
(
1− 1+g+ℓ
g+ℓ
ε′
)ε′
=
1 + g − ℓ
g
ℓ− (1 + g + ℓ)1+g
g
ε′
1 + ℓ
g
1
g+ℓ
ε′ − (1+g)(1+g+ℓ)
g(g+ℓ)
(ε′)2
1
g + ℓ
ε′
βi,t+2 =
(1− βi,t+1) {δ(1 + g)− g} − βi,t+1ℓ−
λ
δ(1−βi,t)
δ(1− βi,t+1)(1 + g)
, ∀ t ∈N.
The following Lemma 1, which is proved in Appendix B, ensures that any βi,t is greater than5
zero and smaller than one.6
Lemma 1. Suppose that Assumptions 2 and 3 are satisfied. Fix any discount factor δ ∈ [δ, δ]7
and observation cost λ ∈ (0, λ). Then, it holds that8
1
2
1 + g − ℓ
g + ℓ
ε′ < βi,2 < βi,4 < βi,6 · · · < βi,5 < βi,3 < βi,1 =
1 + g + ℓ
g + ℓ
ε′.
Strategy σ∗ is the strategy defined by the above automaton.9
Next we define a consistent system of beliefs with strategy profile σ∗. We consider a10
sequence of behavioral strategy profiles (σˆn)∞n=1 such that each strategy profile attaches a11
positive probability to every move, but puts far greater weights on the trembles on Ci in the12
defection state ωDi compared with other stage behaviors in the other states. These trembles13
induce a consistent system of beliefs that player i at any defection state ωDi is sure that the14
state of their opponent is the defection state ωDj or transition state ω
E,t
j for some t ≥ 2.15
Let us confirm this property of the belief. There are two cases where player i moves to the16
defection state ωDi ; (1) player i observes Dj, (2) player i chooses Di. The property is obvious17
in the first case. In any state of player j, player j moves to the defection state ωDj after he18
chooses Dj. Furthermore, the defection state ω
D
j is an absorbing state. Therefore, player i is19
certain that player j is in the defection state ωDj after player i observes Dj. The property is20
not obvious in the second case; ai = Di. Let us consider the following history of player i in21
period 3. Player i chooses ai = Di and mi = 0 in period 1, and he chooses Ci and mi = 1 (by22
mistakes) and observes Cj in period 2. We can consider the following two types of player j’s23
histories which are consistent with the history of player i. The first type of history is that24
player j chooses aj = Dj in period 1, and he chooses aj = Cj (by mistake) at the defection25
state ωDj in period 2. The second type of history is that player j chooses aj = Cj and mj = 026
in period 1, and he chooses aj = Cj (by mistake) at the transition state ω
E,2
j in period 2. As27
we put far greater weights on the trembles on Cj in the defection state ω
D
j , player i is sure28
that the first type of history is realized, and player j is in the defection state ωDj . A similar29
argument holds even if player i observes (ai, oi) = (Ci, Cj) many times after he chooses Di.30
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An illustration1
We here explain that the strategy σ∗ is a sequential equilibrium whose payoff vector (v∗1, v
∗
2)2
satisfies v∗i ≥ 1− ε for each i = 1, 2.3
Let us consider sequential rationality in each state. First, we consider the defection4
state ωDi . As we have considered above, player i in the defection state ω
D
i is certain that5
player j is in the defection state ωDj . Therefore, action Di is optimal because player i is sure6
that player j does not observe player i. As player i is certain that player j is in the defection7
state ωDj and chooses Dj, observational decision mi = 0 is also optimal.8
Let us consider sequential rationality in the initial and cooperation states. By the defini-9
tion of βj,2 and βj,3, player i is indifferent among (Ci, 1), (Ci, 0), and (Di, 0). Furthermore,10
if player i chooses Di in the initial state ω
1
i , player j moves to the transition state ω
E,2
j or11
defection state ωDj . In either case, the continuation strategy of player j is a repetition of12
(aj,mj) = (Dj, 0). As the observation result has no effect on the conjecture over the con-13
tinuation strategy, player i has no incentive to choose mi = 0 when he chooses action Di.14
Therefore, it is optimal for player i to follow strategy σ∗ in the initial state ω1i .15
In the cooperation state ωC,ti (t ≥ 2), player i is indifferent to his observational decisions16
by the definition of βj,t+2. It is also suboptimal to choose (a
t
i,m
t
i) = (Di, 1) as in the initial17
state ω1i . Furthermore, the definition of βj,t+1 ensures that player i strictly prefers action Ci18
to Di in the cooperation state ω
C,t
i . Using (2) for t− 1, we obtain the following equation.19
(1− βj,t)− βj,t+1ℓ+ δ(1− βj,t)(1− βj,t+1)(1 + g)− δ(1 + g) =
λ
δ(1− βj,t−1)
(3)
The first three terms on the right-hand side represent the nonaveraged payoff when player i20
chooses Ci and mi = 0 in the cooperation state ω
C,t
i . The last term on the right-hand side is21
the nonaveraged payoff when player i chooses (ai,mi) = (Di, 0) in the cooperation state ω
C,t
i .22
Therefore, (3) shows that choosing Di at the cooperation ω
C,t
i state is not optimal. Sequential23
rationality at the cooperation state ωC,ti is satisfied.24
Another explanation is as follows. Suppose that player i weakly prefers action Di at the25
cooperation state ωC,ti in period t. As player j moves to the transition state ω
E,t+1
i or the26
defection state ωDj after player i chooses Di in period t, the assumption implies that player i27
weakly prefers (ai,mi) = (Di, 0) from period t onwards. One of the optimal continuation28
strategies from the cooperation state ωC,ti coincides with the one from the defection state ω
D
i .29
Then, player i has no incentive to observe player j in the cooperation state ωt−1i because the30
repetition of (ai,mi) = (Di, 0) is one of his optimal continuation strategies irrespective of the31
observation result. It contradicts the definition of βj,t+1. Therefore, player i strictly prefers32
action Ci in the cooperation state ω
C,t
i .33
Next, let us consider the transition state ωE,ti . In the transition state ω
E,t
i , player i does not34
know the action chosen by the opponent in the previous period t− 1. If (ai, aj) = (Ci, Cj) is35
realized in the previous period, player i should be at the cooperation state ωC,ti and action Di36
is suboptimal.37
Although action Di is suboptimal in the cooperation state ω
C,t
i , the payoff when player i38
chooses Di at ω
C,t
i is close enough to the one when he chooses Di at ω
C,t
i when the observation39
cost λ is sufficiently small. If the payoffs are not close to each other, player i strictly prefers40
mi = 1 at the cooperation state ω
C,t−1
i to know which state he should move to because the41
observation cost is small.42
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The loss from choosing Di in the transition state ω
E,t
i is small. The loss from choosing1
Ci is strictly positive. Player j is in the transition state ω
E,t
j or defection state ω
D
j with2
probability at least (1−βj,t−1)(1−βj,t), and then choosing Ci makes a loss of −ℓ. Therefore,3
choosing Ci is suboptimal at the transition state ω
E,t
i . We will prove this fact in Appendix A.4
Next, let us consider the observation decision in the transition state ωE,ti . It is straightfor-5
ward that if player i chooses Di, then mi = 0 is optimal. Assume that player i chooses Ci. If6
player j chooses Cj in the previous period, then player i should have been at the cooperation7
state ωC,ti and one of the optimal stage behaviors given action Ci was mi = 0. If player j8
chooses Dj in the previous period, then one of player i’s optimal stage behaviors was mi = 0.9
In each case, mi = 0 is optimal. Therefore, mi = 0 is optimal in the transition state ω
E,t
i .10
Lastly, let us consider the payoff. As player 1 prefers action Di in the initial state ω
1
i , his11
payoff is given by12
v∗i = (1− δ)(1− βj,1)(1 + g)
= {1− (1 + g)ε′}
(
1−
1 + g + ℓ
g + ℓ
ε′
)
> 1−
(
1 + g +
1 + g + ℓ
g + ℓ
)
ε′
> 1− ε.
Therefore, we have obtained Proposition 1.13
Remark 1. In our strategy σ∗, the observation result in the current period determines the14
state in the next period independently of the past observation result (on the path of σ∗).15
Thus, each player has no incentive to acquire information in the past. Therefore, even if we16
allow players to purchase information in the past, our efficiency result holds.17
Remark 2. As we do not use interim public randomization, the assumption that each player18
chooses an observational decision after he chooses his action is not crucial. Even if each player19
chooses his action and observational decision together, we can define a strategy and belief in20
a similar manner to strategy σ∗ and belief ψ.21
Proposition 2. Fix any positive ζ > 0. Suppose that Assumptions 2 and 3 are satisfied.22
For any ε > 0, there exist δ ∈
(
g
1+g
, 1
)
, δ ∈ (δ, 1), λ > 0, and η > 0 such that for any23
discount factor δ ∈ [δ, δ], any observation cost λ ∈ (0, λ), and any η1, η2 ∈ [0, η), there exists24
a symmetric sequential equilibrium σ∗ whose payoff vector (v∗1, v
∗
2) satisfies v
∗
i ≥ 1 − ε for25
each i = 1, 2.26
Proof of Proposition 2 . We show that the strategy σ∗ in the proof of Appendix A is a se-27
quential equilibrium under small η1 and η2. If player i is in the cooperation state ω
C,t
i , he28
observed Cj in the previous period. Thus, private signal zi has no effect on player i’s belief.29
The best response stage-behavior in the cooperation state ωC,ti is unchanged. Let us consider30
the transition state ωE,ti or the defection state ω
D
i . In the proof of Appendix A, it has been31
proved that player i strictly prefers Di and mi = 0 in those states given η1 = η2 = 0. There-32
fore, because of continuity of expected utility function, player i strictly prefers prefers Di33
and mi = 0 when η1 and η2 is sufficiently close to zero. Hence, the strategy σ
∗ is a sequential34
equilibrium when η1 and η2 is sufficiently small.35
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Next, we extend Proposition 2 using Lemma 2.1
Lemma 2. Fix any payoff vector v and any ε > 0. Suppose that there exist δ ∈
(
g
1+g
, 1
)
,2
δ ∈ (δ, 1) such that for any discount factor δ ∈ [δ, δ], there exists a sequential equilibrium3
whose payoff vector (v∗1, v
∗
2) satisfies |v
∗
i − vi| ≤ ε for each i = 1, 2. Then, there exists4
δ∗ ∈
(
g
1+g
, 1
)
such that for any discount factor δ ∈ [δ∗, 1), there exists a sequential equilibrium5
whose payoff vector (v∗1, v
∗
2) satisfies |v
∗
i − vi| ≤ ε for each i = 1, 2.6
Proof of Lemma 2 . We use the technique of Lemma 2 in Ellison (1994). We define δ∗ ≡ δ/δ,7
and choose any discount factor δ ∈ (δ∗, 1). Then, we choose some integer n∗ that satisfies8
δn
∗
∈ [δ, δ]. Then there exists a strategy σ∗
′
whose payoff vector is (v∗1, v
∗
2) given δ
n∗ . We9
divide the repeated game into n∗ distinct repeated games. The first repeated game is played in10
period 1, n∗+1, 2n∗+1 . . . , the second repeated game is played in period 2, n∗+1, 2n∗+2 . . . ,11
and so on. Each repeated game can be regarded as a repeated game with discount factor δn
∗
.12
Let us consider the following strategy σL. In the 1st game, players follow strategy σ∗
′
. In the13
2nd game, players follow strategy σ∗
′
. In the n(n ≤ n∗)th game, players follow strategy σ∗
′
.14
Then, strategy σL is a sequential equilibrium because strategy σ∗
′
is a sequential equilibrium15
in each game. As the equilibrium payoff vector in each game satisfies |v∗i − vi| ≤ ε for each16
i = 1, 2, the equilibrium payoff of strategy σL also satisfies |v∗i − vi| ≤ ε for each i = 1, 2.17
We obtain efficiency for a sufficiently high discount factor.18
Proposition 3. Fix any ζ > 0. Suppose that Assumptions 2 and 3 are satisfied. For any19
ε > 0, there exist δ∗ ∈ (0, 1), λ > 0, and η > 0 such that for any discount factor δ ∈ (δ∗, 1),20
any λ ∈ (0, λ), and any η1, η2 ∈ [0, η), there exists a sequential equilibrium whose payoff21
vector (v∗1, v
∗
2) satisfies v
∗
i ≥ 1− ε for each i = 1, 2.22
Proof of Proposition 3 . Apply Lemma 2 to Proposition 1.23
Remark 3. Proposition 3 shows monotonicity of efficiency on the discount factor. If effi-24
ciency holds given some ε, observation cost λ, η1, η2 and discount factor δ, then efficiency25
holds given a sufficiently large discount factor δ′ > δ.26
4.2 Folk theorem27
In what follows, we introduce an interim public randomization device at the end of the action28
phase. Public signal x is uniformly distributed over [0, 1) independently of the action profile29
chosen. Each player observes the interim public signal without cost. The purpose of interim30
public randomization is to prove a folk theorem (Theorem 1).31
Let32
F ≡ convex hull of {u(a)| a ∈ A} ,
F∗ ≡{v ∈ F| v1 ≥ 0 and v2 ≥ 0} .
Theorem 1 (Approximate folk theorem). Suppose that an interim public randomization is33
available, and Assumptions 2 and 3 are satisfied. Fix any positive ζ > 0. Fix any interior34
point v = (v1, v2) of F
∗. Fix any ε > 0. There exist a discount factor δ ∈
(
g
1+g
, 1
)
,35
observation cost λ > 0, and η > 0 such that for any δ ∈ [δ, 1), any λ ∈ (0, λ), and any36
η1, η2 ∈ [0, η), there exists a sequential equilibrium whose payoff vector v
F = (vF1 , v
F
2 ) satisfies37
|vFi − vi| ≤ ε.38
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To prove Theorem 1, we prove the following proposition first.1
Proposition 4. Suppose that a public randomization device is available, and η1 = η2 = 0,2
Assumptions 2 and 3 are satisfied. For any ε > 0, there exist δ ∈
(
g
1+g
, 1
)
, δ ∈ (δ, 1), and3
λ > 0 such that for any discount factor δ ∈ [δ, δ] and for any observation cost λ ∈ (0, λ),4
there exists a sequential equilibrium σ∗∗ whose payoff vector (v∗∗1 , v
∗∗
2 ) satisfies v
∗∗
1 = 0 and5
v∗∗2 ≥
1+g+ℓ
1+ℓ
− ε.6
Strategy7
First, we define strategy σ∗∗ independently of private signal z, which will be used to present8
Proposition 4.9
Fix any ε > 0. We define ε, δ, δ, and λ as follows.10
ε ≡
ℓ2
54(1 + g)3
ε
1 + ε
,
δ ≡
g
1 + g
+ ε,
δ ≡
g
1 + g
+ 2ε < 1,
λ ≡
1
16
ℓ
(1 + 2g)2
ε2.
We fix an arbitrary discount factor δ ∈ [δ, δ] and an arbitrary observation cost λ ∈ (0, λ). We11
show that there exists a sequential equilibrium whose payoff vector (v∗∗1 , v
∗∗
2 ) satisfies v
∗∗
1 = 012
and v∗∗2 ≥
1+g+ℓ
1+ℓ
− ε.13
Applying the strategy in Section 4.1, let us consider another automaton strategy pro-14
file σ∗∗. Player 1 has five types of states: Initial state ωˆ11, adjustment state ω
A
1 , cooperation15
states (ωC,t1 )
∞
t=3, transition states (ω
E,t
1 )
∞
t=3, and defection state ω
D
1 . Player 2 also has five16
types of states: Initial state ωˆ12, adjustment state ω
A
2 , cooperation states (ω
C,t
2 )
∞
t=3, transition17
states (ωE,t2 )
∞
t=1, and defection state ω
D
2 .18
The stage behaviors and transition functions in the cooperation states (ωC,t1 )
∞
t=3 and19
(ωC,t2 )
∞
t=2, transition states (ω
E,t
1 )
∞
t=3 and (ω
E,t
2 )
∞
t=2, and the defections state ω
D
i are the same20
as those given in strategy σ∗. Note that ωˆ1i , ω
A
i , and ω
E,1
2 are new states.21
To define the stage behaviors and transition functions in the new states, we use the22
sequence (βi,t)
∞
i=1,2,t=1, which is defined in the proof of Proposition 1. Let us define23
xˆ ≡
ℓ
δ(1− β2,2)(1 + g)
.
Player 1 chooses stage behavior C1 with probability β1,1, and D1 with probability 1−β1,124
in the initial state ωˆ11. Irrespective of player 1’s action, he chooses m1 = 0. The state remains25
the same if realized x is greater than xˆ. Player 1 moves to the adjustment state ωA1 if player 126
chose C1 and realized x is smaller than xˆ. Player 1 moves to the defection state ω
D
1 if player 127
chose C1 and realized x is smaller than xˆ. In the adjustment state ω
A
1 , player 1 chooses C128
with probability 1− β1,2. If player 1 chooses Ci, he chooses m1 = 1 with probability 1− β1,3.29
When player 1 chooses D1, he never observes the opponent. The transition function in the30
adjustment state ωA1 is the same as the one in the transition state ω
E,2
1 .31
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The prescribed actions and observational decisions, and state transition function are sum-1
marized in the table and figure below.2
State ωˆ11 ω
A
1 ω
C,t
1 ω
E,t
1 ω
D
1
Action
C1 w.p. 1− β1,1
D1 w.p. β1,1
C1 w.p. 1− β1,2,
D1 w.p. β1,2 Same as in
strategy σ∗
m1 given C1 m1 = 0
m1 = 1 w.p. 1− β1,3
m1 = 0 w.p. β1,3
m1 given D1 m1 = 0
Table 4: Actions and observational decisions of player 1
ωˆ11 ω
A
1 ω
C,3
1 ω
C,4
1
ωD1 ω
E,3
1 ω
E,4
1
. . .
. . .
x > xˆ
a1 = D1
and
x ≤ xˆ
a1 = C1
and
x ≤ xˆ
a1 = D1
or
o1 = D2
(C1, C2) (C1, C2) (C1, C2)
(C1, ϕ1) (C1, ϕ1) (C1, ϕ1)
(C1, C2) (C1, C2)
(C1, ϕ1) (C1, ϕ1)
If player 1 chooses D1 or observes D2 in states ω
A
1 , ω
C,t
1 , or ω
E,t
1
for some t ≥ 3, the state moves to ωD1 .
Figure 2: State transition function of player 1
Player 2 chooses D2 in the initial state ωˆ
1
2. Player 2 observes player 1 with probability 1−3
β2,1 irrespective of her action when realized x is not greater than xˆ. The state remains the4
same if realized x is smaller than xˆ. Player 2 moves to the adjustment state ωA2 if she5
observes C1 and realized x is smaller than xˆ. Player 1 moves to the defection state ω
D
1 if she6
observes C1 and realized x is smaller than xˆ. Player 2 moves to the adjustment state ω
E,1
2 if7
she chooses m2 = 0 and realized x is smaller than xˆ. In the adjustment state ω
A
2 , player 28
chooses C2. When player 2 chooses C2, she observes player 1 with probability 1 − β2,2 If9
player 2 chooses D2, she does not observe the opponent. In the transition state ω
E,1
2 , player 210
chooses D2 and m2 = 0 irrespective of her action. The transition functions in the adjustment11
state ωA2 and the transition state ω
E,1
2 are the same as the one in the initial state ω
1
2 given12
strategy σ∗. That is, if player 2 observes (C2, C1), she moves to the cooperation state ω
C,2
2 .13
If player 2 chooses C2 but does not observe, she moves to the transition state ω
E,2
2 . When14
player 2 chooses D2 or observes D1, she moves to the defection state ω
D
2 .15
The prescribed actions and observational decisions, and state transition function are sum-16
marized in the table and figure below.17
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State ωˆ12 ω
A
2 ω
E,1
2 ω
C,t
2
ωE,t2
(t ≥ 2 )
ωD2
Action D2 C2 D2 Same as in
strategy σ∗m2 given C2
m2 = 1 w.p. 1− β2,1
m2 = 0 w.p. β2,1
m2 = 1 w.p. 1− β2,2
m2 = 0 w.p. β2,2
m2 = 0
m2 given D2 mi = 0
Table 5: Actions and observational decisions of player 2
ωˆ12 ω
A
2 ω
C,2
2 ω
C,3
2
ωD2 ω
E,1
2 ω
E,2
2 ω
E,3
2
. . .
. . .
x > xˆ
a2 = D2
and
x ≤ xˆ
a2 = C2
and
x ≤ xˆ
(C2, ϕ2)
and
x ≤ xˆ
(C2, C1) (C2, C1) (C2, C1)
(C2, ϕ2) (C2, ϕ2) (C2, ϕ2)
(C2, C1) (C2, C1) (C2, C1)
(C2, ϕ2) (C2, ϕ2) (C2, ϕ2)
If player 2 chooses D2 or observes D2 in states ω
A
2 ,ω
C,t
1 ,
or ωE,t2 for some t ≥ 1, the state moves to the defection state ω
D
2 .
Figure 3: State transition function of player 2
Let strategy σ∗∗ be the strategy defined by the above automaton. Next, we define a1
consistent system of beliefs with strategy profile σ∗∗. We consider a sequence of behavioral2
strategy profiles (σˆn)∞n=1 such that each strategy profile attaches a positive probability to3
every move, but puts far greater weights on the trembles on Ci in the defection state ω
D
i4
compared with other stage behaviors in the other states. These trembles induce a consistent5
system of beliefs that player i at any defection state ωDi is sure that the state of their opponent6
is the defection state ωDj or transition state ω
E,t
j for some t ≥ 2.7
Proof of Proposition 4 . Here we prove Proposition 4 using strategy σ∗∗.8
Let us consider the sequential rationality of player 1. We consider the defection state ωD1 .9
As in the proof of Proposition 1, player 1 in the defection state ωD1 is certain that player 2 is10
in the defection state ωD2 or transition state ω
E,t
2 for some t ≥ 1. Therefore, it is optimal for11
player 1 to choose action D1 and choose m1 = 0 irrespective of his action.12
Next, let us consider a cooperation state ωC,t1 (t ≥ 3). Player 1 believes that player 2 is in13
the cooperation state ωC,t−11 with probability 1− β2,t−1 and the transition state ω
E,t−1
1 with14
the remaining probability β2,t−1. This is the same belief over the opponent’s state as the15
one that player 1 has in the cooperation state ωC,t−11 given strategy σ
∗. Hence, the optimal16
stage behavior is also the same as the one of the cooperation state ωC,t−11 given strategy σ
∗.17
Therefore, it is optimal for player 1 to choose C1. When player 1 chooses C1, player 1 is18
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indifferent to his observational decision. Using the same argument, the sequential rationality1
in the transition state ωE,31 (t ≥ 3) is also straightforward.2
Let us consider the adjustment state ωA1 . Player 2 is in the adjustment state ω
A
2 with3
probability 1 − β2,1. Player 2 observes player 1 with probability 1 − β2,3 given action C24
in the adjustment state ωA2 . Furthermore, the state transition functions in the adjustment5
state ωA2 and the state transition state ω
E,1
2 are the same as the one in the initial state ω
1
26
given strategy σ∗. This conjecture over the continuation play of player 1 is the same as the7
one in the initial state ω11 given strategy σ
∗. Therefore, player 1 is indifferent among (C1, 1),8
(C1, 0), and (D1, 0). When player 1 chooses D1, player 1 prefers m1 = 0.9
Finally, let us consider the initial state ωˆ11. If player 1 chooses D1, he obtains zero payoff.10
If player 1 chooses C1 and x ≤ xˆ is realized, player 1 will move to the adjustment state.11
Then, choosing (D1, 0) in the adjustment state, player 1 obtains (1 − δ)(1 − β2,1)(1 + g).12
Therefore, the indifference condition between action C1 and action D1 is given by13
0 = −ℓ+ xˆδ(1− δ)(1− β2,1)(1 + g).
This condition is ensured by the definition of xˆ. In addition, m1 = 0 is optimal irrespective14
of his actions because player 2 chooses D2 with certainty. Therefore, it is optimal for player 115
to follow the strategy σ∗∗.16
Next, let us consider player 2. Applying similar arguments of player 1 to states ωD2 ,17
ωC,t2 (t ≥ 2), and ω
E,t
2 (t ≥ 2), we can show the sequential rationality in those states. The18
sequential rationality in the defection state ωD2 is straightforward because player 2 is sure19
that player 1 is in the transition state or the defection state. In the cooperation state ωC,t2 ,20
player 1 is in the cooperation state ωC,t+11 with probability 1 − β1,t+1. This belief over the21
continuation play of player 1 is the same as the one that player 2 has in the cooperation state22
ωC,t+12 given strategy σ
∗. Therefore, choosing C2 is optimal and player 2 is indifferent to her23
observational decision given C2. When player 2 chooses D2, she prefers m2 = 0. Similarly,24
it is obvious that D2 and m2 = 0 irrespective of his action are optimal in the transition25
state ωE,t2 .26
Let us consider the adjustment state ωA2 . Then, player 2 is certain that player 1 is in27
the adjustment state ωA1 . Then, player 1 chooses C1 with probability 1− β1,2, and observes28
player 2 with probability 1 − β1,3 given C1. Furthermore, the state transition function of29
player 1 is the same as the one in the cooperation state ωC,21 . The conjecture is the same as30
the one in the cooperation state ωC,22 given strategy σ
∗. Therefore, choosing C2 is optimal,31
and player 2 is indifferent to her observation decisions given C2. When player 2 chooses D2,32
she prefers m2 = 0. We apply the same argument to the transition state ω
E,1
2 and obtain33
that it is optimal for player 2 to choose D2 and m2 = 0 irrespective of her action.34
Using similar arguments again, we can consider the initial state ωˆ12 as well. Consider35
observation phase after x ≤ xˆ is realized. If player 2 observes C1, player 1 moves to the36
adjustment state ωA1 for sure. As we confirmed before, the belief in the adjustment state ω
A
237
is the same as the one in the cooperation state ωC,22 given strategy σ
∗. If player 2 observes D1,38
player 1 moves to the adjustment state ωD1 with certainty. This conjecture is the same as the39
one player 2 faces in the observation phase given C2 in the initial state ω
1
2 given strategy σ
∗.40
Therefore, player 2 is indifferent between m2 = 1 and m2 = 0. Furthermore, it is obvious41
that player 2 has no incentive to choose D2 in the action phase in the initial state ωˆ
1
2 because42
player 1 does not observe player 2 in the initial state ωˆ11. It has been proved that this43
strategy σ∗∗ is a sequential equilibrium.44
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Finally, let us consider the equilibrium payoff. It is obvious that v∗∗1 equals zero because1
player 1 (weakly) prefers action D1 in the initial state ωˆ
1
1. Player 2 prefers action D2 in the2
initial state ωˆ12. In the adjustment state ω
A
2 , one of the best responses is choosing C2 and3
m2 = 0, and the payoff is bounded below by the one of choosing D2 and m2 = 0. Therefore,4
player 2’s payoff is bounded below by5
v∗∗2 >(1− δ) {(1− β1,1)(1 + g)− xˆλ}+ δxˆ(1− δ)(1− β1,2)(1 + g) + δ(1− xˆ)v
∗∗
2
>(1− δ) {(1− β1,1)(1 + g)− λ}+ xˆ(1− δ)(1− β1,2)g + δ(1− xˆ)v
∗∗
2
>(1− δ) (1− β1,1) (1 + g + xˆg)− (1− δ)λ+ δ(1− xˆ)v
∗∗
2 .
The second inequality holds because δ > δ > g
1+g
and xˆ < 1 hold. Lemma 1 ensures6
β1,2 < β1,1 and the third inequality.7
Subtracting δ(1− xˆ)v∗∗2 from both sides, we obtain8
v∗∗2 >
(
1− 1+g+ℓ
g+ℓ
ε′
)
(1 + g + xˆg)− λ
1 + δ
1−δ
xˆ
>
1 + g + xˆg − 2(1 + g)1+g+ℓ
g+ℓ
ε′
1 + δ
1−δ
xˆ
.
In what follows, we often use the following lemma.9
Lemma 3. For any y ∈
(
0, 1
2
)
, it holds that10
1 + y <
1
1− y
< 1 + 2y,
1− y <
1
1 + y
< 1.
Proof of Lemma 3. This can be shown with simple calculations.11
Let us consider the denominator.12
1 +
δ
1− δ
xˆ =1 +
g + (1 + g)ε′
1− (1 + g)ε′
xˆ = 1 +
(
1 + g
1− (1 + g)ε′
− 1
)
xˆ
<1 + {(1 + g)(1 + 2(1 + g)ε′)− 1} xˆ
=1 +
{
g + 2g(1 + g)2ε′
}
xˆ
Lemma 3 ensures the inequality.13
The value of xˆ is bounded above by14
xˆ =
ℓ
δ(1− β2,2)(1 + g)
<
1
1− 1+g+ℓ
g+ℓ
ε′
ℓ
g
<
(
1 + 2
1 + g + ℓ
g + ℓ
ε′
)
ℓ
g
.
Lemma 3 ensures the last inequality. Therefore, we have an upper bound of the denominator15
as follows.16
1 +
δ
1− δ
xˆ <1 +
{
g + 2(1 + g)2ε′
}(
1 + 2
1 + g + ℓ
g + ℓ
ε′
)
ℓ
g
<1 +
{
ℓ+ 2(1 + g)2ε′
}(
1 + 2
1 + 2g
g
ε′
)
<1 + ℓ+ 2(1 + g)2ε′ + 2(1 + 2g)ε′ + (1 + g)2ε′
<1 + ℓ+ 5(1 + 2g)2ε′.
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The third inequality follows from Assumption 3 and ε′ < 2ε.1
Next, let us consider a lower bound of the numerator.2
1 + g + xˆg − 2(1 + g)
1 + g + ℓ
g + ℓ
ε′ >1 + g + xˆg − 2
(1 + 2g)2
g
ε′.
The value of xˆ has the following lower bound.3
xˆ >
ℓ
g + (1 + g)ε′
=
1
1 + 1+g
g
ε′
ℓ
g
>
(
1−
1 + g
g
ε′
)
ℓ
g
=
ℓ
g
−
1 + g
g
ε′.
Thus, the numerator is bounded below by4
1 + g +
(
ℓ
g
−
1 + g
g
ε′
)
g − 2
(1 + 2g)2
g
ε′ > 1 + g + ℓ− 3
(1 + 2g)2
g
ε′.
The last inequality is ensured by Lemma 3.5
Therefore, we obtain a lower bound of v∗∗2 as follows.6
v∗∗2 >
1 + g + ℓ− 3 (1+2g)
2
g
ε′
1 + ℓ+ 5(1 + 2g)2ε′
>
1 + g + ℓ
1 + ℓ

1− 3 (1+2g)2g(1+g+ℓ)ε′
1 + 5 (1+2g)
2
1+ℓ
ε′


>
1 + g + ℓ
1 + ℓ
(
1− 3
(1 + 2g)2
g(1 + g + ℓ)
ε′
)(
1− 5
(1 + 2g)2
1 + ℓ
ε′
)
>
1 + g + ℓ
1 + ℓ
(
1− 3
(1 + 2g)2
g
ε′
)(
1− 5
(1 + 2g)2
g
ε′
)
>
1 + g + ℓ
1 + ℓ
(
1− 8
(1 + 2g)2
g
ε′
)
>
1 + g + ℓ
1 + ℓ
− 8
(1 + 2g)3
g
ε′ > 1− ε.
7
Let us explain why we need an interim public randomization device and why we cannot8
use a public randomization device at the end of the observation phase instead of interim9
public randomization. In our strategy, the defection state ωDi is an absorbing state. It is10
also obvious that the payoff vector of (D1, D2) is Pareto inefficient. Therefore, to achieve11
a nearly Pareto-efficient outcome, the probability that each player i moves to the defection12
state ωDi must be small enough. It means that the observation probability of player 2 in13
the initial state ωˆ12 and the probability of C1 in the initial state ωˆ
1
1 must be high enough.14
However, taking Assumption 3 into account, player 1 has a stronger incentive to choose15
C1 given strategy σ
∗∗ than given strategy σ∗, and does not randomize actions C1 and D1.16
To mitigate this strong incentive, we need a public randomization device. It is well known17
that we can decrease the efficient discount factor by dividing the game into several games18
(e.g., Ellison (1994)). Moving back to the initial state irrespective of stage behavior with19
a certain probability, player i considers the continuation payoff to be less important. Let δˆ20
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be an efficient discount factor in the initial state. If player 1 chooses D1 in the initial state,1
he obtains 0. If player 1 chooses C1 in the initial state, he obtains a nonaveraged payoff2
−ℓ + δˆ(1 + g). Therefore, to make player 1 indifferent between actions C1 and D1 in the3
initial state ωˆ11, the efficient discount factor must be close to
ℓ
1+g
.4
It will affect not only player 1 but also player 2’s incentive. As the continuation payoff5
is less important, player 2’s observation incentive decreases. To keep the right-hand side of6
(3) unchanged, the probability γ1,1 of D1 in the initial state ωˆ
1
1 must satisfy the following7
equation.8
δ(1− β1,2) = δˆ(1− γ1,1)
or,9
γ1,1 = 1−
δ
δˆ
(1− β1,2).
Taking δ ∼ g
1+g
, δˆ ∼ ℓ
1+g
, Assumption 3, and β1,2 ∼ 0 into account, we find that γ1,1 ∼ 1−
ℓ
g
is10
negative. Therefore, we cannot make player 2 indifferent to her observational decisions when11
player 1 is indifferent between actions C1 and D1. We need an interim public randomization12
device to mitigate player 1’s incentive independently of player 2’s incentive.13
Corollary 4.1. Suppose that an interim public randomization device is available, and As-14
sumptions 2 and 3 are satisfied. Fix any positive ζ > 0. For any ε > 0, there exist15
δ ∈
(
g
1+g
, 1
)
, δ ∈ (δ, 1), λ > 0, and η > 0 such that for any discount factor δ ∈ [δ, δ],16
any observation cost λ ∈ (0, λ), and any η1, η2 ≤ η, there exists a sequential equilibrium σ
∗∗
17
whose payoff vector (v∗∗1 , v
∗∗
2 ) satisfies v
∗∗
1 = 0 and v
∗∗
2 ≥
1+g+ℓ
1+ℓ
− ε.18
Proof of Corollary 4.1 . Let us show that strategy σ∗∗ is a sequential equilibrium if η1 and19
η2 is sufficiently small. If player i is in the cooperation state ω
C,t
i , the private signal zi has20
no effect on the belief of player i because player i directly observed player j’s action, Cj, in21
the previous period. In the adjustment state ωA1 , player 1 is certain that player 2 chose D2 in22
the initial state ωˆ12. Hence, the private signal zi does not change the belief and best response23
stage-behavior of player 1 when player 1 is in the cooperation or adjustment states. In the24
transition or defection states, player 1 strictly prefers action D1 and m1 = 0 when η2 = 0.25
Therefore, because of continuity of expected utility function, it is optimal for player 1 to26
choose action D1 and m1 = 0 if η2 is sufficiently small. Thus, it is optimal for player 1 to27
follow strategy σ∗∗ if η2 is sufficiently small.28
Let us consider player 2. In any transition state ωE,t2 (t ≥ 1), player 2 strictly prefers29
action D2 and m2 = 0 when η1 = 0. Thus, it is optimal for player 2 choose action D230
and m2 = 0 when η1 is sufficiently small. In adjustment and cooperation states, the private31
signal z2 has no effect to player 2’s belief because player 2 observed C1 in the previous period.32
Hence, it is optimal for player 2 to follow strategy σ∗∗ if η1 is sufficiently small. Thus, the33
strategy σ∗∗ is a sequential equilibrium if η1 and η2 are sufficiently small.34
Corollary 4.2. Suppose that an interim public randomization device is available, and As-35
sumptions 2 and 3 are satisfied. Fix any ζ > 0. For any ε > 0, there exist δ ∈
(
g
1+g
, 1
)
,36
λ > 0, and η > 0 such that for any discount factor δ ∈ [δ, 1), any observation cost λ ∈ (0, λ),37
and any η1, η2 ∈ [0, η), there exists a sequential equilibrium σ
∗∗ whose payoff vector (v∗∗1 , v
∗∗
2 )38
satisfies v∗∗1 = 0 and v
∗∗
2 ≥
1+g+ℓ
1+ℓ
− ε.39
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Proof of Corollary 4.2 . Use Lemma 2.1
We have shown that two payoff vectors can be approximated by sequential equilibria2
(Propositions 1 and 4) when the discount factor is sufficiently large and the observation cost3
is sufficiently small. It is straightforward that a payoff vector
(
1+g+ℓ
1+ℓ
, 0
)
can be approximated4
by a sequential equilibrium exchanging the roles of player 1 and player 2.5
Using the technique in Ellison (1994) again and alternating four strategies σ∗, σ∗∗, and6
the repetition of the stage game Nash equilibrium, we can approximate any payoff vector7
in F∗.8
Proof of Theorem 1. See Appendix C.9
Remark 4. As Miyagawa et al. (2008) mentioned, some previous literature requires a very10
complicate strategy and a very high discount factor for their results. On the other hand,11
our strategy is much simpler than theirs and a required discount factor is not high. For the12
payoff vector (1, 1) or
(
1+g+ℓ
1+ℓ
, 0
)
, a slightly larger discount factor than g
1+g
is required (See13
Propositions 1 and 4). If we can use a public randomization device at the beginning of the14
repeated game, our folk theorem holds with the same level of discount factor.15
Remark 5. Let us discuss what happens if the prisoner’s dilemma is asymmetric, as in16
Table 6.17
Player 2
C2 D2
Player 1
C1 1 , 1 −ℓ1 , 1 + g2
D1 1 + g1, −ℓ2 0 , 0
Table 6: Asymmetric prisoner’s dilemma
In the proofs of the propositions and theorems, we require that the discount factor δ is18
sufficiently close to g
1+g
. This condition is needed to approximate a Pareto-efficient payoff19
vector. If g1 ̸= g2, it is impossible to ensure that the discount factor δ is sufficiently close to20
both g1
1+g1
and g2
1+g2
. Therefore, we have to confine our attention to the case of g1 = g2 = g.21
Let us consider Propositions 1 and 3. In the construction of the strategy, the randomiza-22
tion probability of player i is defined based on the incentive constraint of the opponent only,23
or, it is determined based on δ, g, ℓj and is independent of ℓi. Hence, if g1 = g2 and Assump-24
tions 2 and 3 for each ℓi (i = 1, 2) hold, our approximate efficiency result and approximate25
folk theorem hold under a small observation cost. Symmetricity of ℓ1 and ℓ2 is not important26
for our strategy although symmetricity of g1 = g2 is crucial.27
5 Concluding Remarks28
Prisoner’s dilemma is a minimal model to describe cooperation because it has only two29
actions: cooperation and uncooperation. Prisoner’s dilemma under costly observation has30
some difficulties in cooperation.31
First, the number of actions is limited. This means that players cannot communicate using32
a variety of actions. If more than two actions are available, we can consider an equilibrium33
strategy where each player randomizes some two actions on the equilibrium path. If a player34
has an incentive to randomize actions Ci and Di on the path in infinitely repeated prisoner’s35
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dilemma, it means that the repetition of Di is one of the optimal strategies. Player i loses1
an incentive to observe because one of his optimal strategies is unchanged irrespective of his2
observation result.3
Second, the number of players is limited. If there are three players A,B, and C, it4
is easy to check the observation deviation of the opponents. Player A can monitor the5
observational decisions of players B and C by comparing their actions. If players B and6
C choose inconsistent actions toward each other, player A finds that players B or C do7
not observe some of the players. Third, there is no free-cost informative signal. To obtain8
information about the actions chosen by their opponents, players have to observe. Despite9
the above limitations, we have shown our efficiency without randomization device.10
We considered an interim public randomization device and obtained a folk theorem. It is11
worth mentioning that our folk theorem holds in some asymmetric prisoner’s dilemma. Our12
results might be applied to more general games.13
Appendix14
A Proof of Proposition 115
Proof. We prove Proposition 1. Now, let us show that the strategy profile σ∗ is a sequential16
equilibrium. The equilibrium payoff and the sequential rationalities in the initial, coopera-17
tion, and defection states have already been shown in Section 4. We consider th sequential18
rationality in the transition state ωE,ti in detail.19
We consider any history in period t (≥ 2) associated with the transition state. Strategy σ∗20
prescribes Di and mi = 0 irrespective of his actions in the transition state. Let us consider21
a nonaveraged continuation payoff when player i chooses action Ci. Let p be the belief of22
player i that his opponent is in the cooperation state ωC,tj . Therefore, if player i observes23
his opponent in period t, then (ati, o
t
i) = (Ci, Cj) is realized with probability p and the state24
moves to the cooperation state ωC,t+1i . Let25
Wi,t ≡ {(1− βj,t) · 1− βj,t · ℓ}+ δ(1− βj,t)(1− βj,t+1)(1 + g). (4)
The value of Wi,t is the nonaveraged continuation payoff from the cooperation state ω
C,t
i26
when player i follows strategy σ∗i . Therefore, the upper bound of the nonaveraged payoff27
when player i chooses action Ci in period t is given by28
p− (1− p)ℓ+ δpWi,t+1.
The nonaveraged payoff when player i chooses Di is bounded above by p(1 + g). Therefore,29
action Di is profitable if the following value is negative.30
p− (1− p)ℓ+ δpWi,t+1 − p(1 + g).
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We can rewrite the above value as follows.1
p− (1− p)ℓ+ δpWi,t+1 − p(1 + g)
=(1− βj,t)− βj,tℓ− λ+ δ(1− βj,t)Wi,t+1 − (1− βj,t)(1 + g)
+ λ+ {p− (1− βj,t)} {1 + ℓ+ δWi,t+1 − (1 + g)}
=Wi,t − (1− βj,t)(1 + g) + λ+ {p− (1− βj,t)} {δWi,t+1 − (g − ℓ)}
=
λ
δ(1− βj,t−1)
+ λ+ {p− (1− βj,t)} {δWi,t+1 − (g − ℓ)} . (5)
The second equality follows from equation (4) in period t. The last equality is ensured by (3)2
in period t− 1.3
Using equation (3), we obtain the lower bound of δWt+1 − (g − ℓ) as follows.4
δWi,t+1 − (g − ℓ) ≥δ(1− βj,t+1)(1 + g)− (g − ℓ)
≥{g + (1 + g)ε′}
(
1−
1 + g + ℓ
g + ℓ
ε′
)
− (g − ℓ)
≥
ℓ
2
. (6)
The second inequality follows from βi,t ≤
1+g+ℓ
g+ℓ
ε′ by Lemma 1. The last inequality is ensured5
by ε′ ≤ 2ε. The maximum value of p is (1 − βj,t−1)(1 − βj,t). Taking (6) into account, we6
show that (5) is negative as follows.7
λ
δ(1− βj,t−1)
+ λ− {(1− βj,t)− p} {δWj,t+1 − (g − ℓ)}
≤
λ
δ(1− βj,t−1)
+ λ− (1− βj,t)βj,t−1
ℓ
2
≤
1 + g
g
1
1− 1+g+ℓ
g+ℓ
ε′
λ+ λ−
(
1−
1 + g + ℓ
g + ℓ
ε′
)
1
2
1 + g − ℓ
g + ℓ
ε′
ℓ
2
< 0.
The second inequality is ensured by δ ∈ [δ, δ] by Lemma 1 and βj,t, βj,t−1 ∈
[
1
2
1+g−ℓ
g+ℓ
ε′, 1+g+ℓ
g+ℓ
ε′
]
.8
Therefore, player i prefers Di to Ci. Hence, it has been proven that it is optimal for player i9
to follow strategy σ∗. The strategy σ∗ is a sequential equilibrium. Proposition 1 has been10
proved.11
B Proof of Lemma 112
Proof of Lemma 1. To prove Lemma 1, we will use the following Lemma 4 holds.13
Lemma 4. Suppose that Assumptions 2 and 3 are satisfied. Fix any discount factor δ ∈ [δ, δ]14
and observation cost λ ∈ (0, λ). Then, βi,1 − βi,2 ≥
ℓ
g+ℓ
ε′ holds and, for any t ∈ N, it holds15
that16
0 <
ℓ
2g
<−
βi,t+2 − βi,t+1
βi,t+1 − βi,t
< 1.
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Assume that Lemma 4 holds. Using βi,t, βi,t+1, and −
βi,t+2−βi,t+1
βi,t+1−βi,t
, we can express βi,t+2 as1
follows.2
βi,t+2 =βi,t + (βi,t+1 − βi,t) + (βi,t+2 − βi,t+1)
=βi,t + (βi,t+1 − βi,t)
{
1−
(
−
βi,t+2 − βi,t+1
βi,t+1 − βi,t
)}
=
(
−
βi,t+2 − βi,t+1
βi,t+1 − βi,t
)
βi,t +
{
1−
(
−
βi,t+2 − βi,t+1
βi,t+1 − βi,t
)}
βi,t+1.
Therefore, if βi,t, βi,t+1 ∈ [0, 1], and
ℓ
2g
< −
βi,t+2−βi,t+1
βi,t+1−βi,t
< 1 hold,3
we obtain βi,t+2 ∈ (min{βi,t, βi,t+1},max{βi,t, βi,t+1}) because βi,t+2 is a convex combination4
of βi,t and βi,t+1.5
Let us compare βi,1, βi,2, and βi,3. By Lemma 4, βi,1− βi,2 is greater than
ℓ
g+ℓ
ε′. Further-6
more, we have βi,2 < βi,3 < βi,1 because −
(
−
βi,t+2−βi,t+1
βi,t+1−βi,t
)
∈ (0, 1) by Lemma 4 and, then,7
βi,3 is a convex combination of βi,1 and βi,2. Next, let us compare βi,2, βi,3, and βi,4. As we8
find, βi,2 is smaller than βi,3. Therefore, we have βi,2 < βi,4 < βi,3 because βi,4 is a convex9
combination of βi,2 and βi,3. Similarly, for any s ∈ N, it holds that (βi,2s <)βi,2s+1 < βi,2s−1,10
and βi,2s < βi,2s+2(< βi,2s+1).11
Next, we prove Lemma 4.12
Proof of Lemma 4. First, let us derive −
βi,3−βi,2
βi,2−βi,1
. By (1), we have13
0 = −(1− βi,1)g − βi,1ℓ+ δ(1 + g)(1− βi,1)(1− βi,2). (7)
Furthermore, by (3), we have14
λ
δ(1− βi,1)
= −(1− βi,2)g − βi,2ℓ+ δ(1 + g)(1− βi,2)(1− βi,3) (8)
By (7) and (8), we obtain15
(βi,2 − βi,1)(g − ℓ)− δ(1 + g)(1− βi,2) {(βi,3 − βi,2) + (βi,2 − βi,1)} =
λ
δ(1− βi,1)
. (9)
Let us consider the lower bound of βi,2. As ε
′ ∈ [ε, 2ε] and 0 < ℓ
g
< 1 hold, we have16
βi,2 =
1 + g − ℓ
g
ℓ− (1 + g + ℓ)1+g
g
ε′
1 + ℓ
g
1
g+ℓ
ε′ − (1+g)(1+g+ℓ)
g(g+ℓ)
(ε′)2
1
g + ℓ
ε′
>
3
4
(1 + g − ℓ)
3
2
1
g + ℓ
ε′ >
1
2
1 + g − ℓ
g + ℓ
ε′.
Next, let us consider the upper bound of βi,2.17
βi,2 =
1 + g − ℓ
g
ℓ− (1 + g + ℓ)1+g
g
ε′
1 + ℓ
g
1
g+ℓ
ε′ − (1+g)(1+g+ℓ)
g(g+ℓ)
(ε′)2
1
g + ℓ
ε′
<
1 + g − ℓ
g
ℓ
1− (1+g)(1+g+ℓ)
g(g+ℓ)
(ε′)2
1
g + ℓ
ε′ <
1 + g
g + ℓ
ε′.
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The last inequality is ensured by ε′ < 2ε. Thus, we obtain1
1
2
1 + g − ℓ
g + ℓ
ε′ < βi,2 <
1 + g
g + ℓ
ε′.
As βi,2 <
1+g
g+ℓ
ε′ < β1 =
1+g+ℓ
g+ℓ
ε′, we can divide both sides of (9) by βi,2 − βi,1 and ob-2
tain −
βi,3−βi,2
βi,2−βi,1
.3
−
βi,3 − βi,2
βi,2 − βi,1
=
ℓ+ δ(1 + g)(1− βi,2)− g +
λ
δ(1−βi,1)(βi,2−βi,1)
δ(1 + g)(1− βi,2)
.
As Assumption 3, βi,1, βi,2 < 1, and βi,2−βi,1 < 0 hold, we find an upper bound of −
βi,3−βi,2
βi,2−βi,1
.4
−
βi,3 − βi,2
βi,2 − βi,1
≤
δ(1 + g)(1− βi,2) +
λ
δ(1−βi,1)(βi,2−βi,1)
δ(1 + g)(1− βi,2)
< 1.
Taking βi,1 =
1+g+ℓ
g+ℓ
ε′, βi,2 <
1+g
g+ℓ
ε′, and −(βi,2 − βi,1) >
ℓ
g+ℓ
ε′ > ℓ
2g
ε′ into account, we have a5
lower bound of −
βi,3−βi,2
βi,2−βi,1
as follows.6
−
βi,3 − βi,2
βi,2 − βi,1
>
ℓ+ g
(
1− 1+g
g+ℓ
ε′
)
− g − λg
1+g (1−
1+g+ℓ
g+ℓ
ε′) ℓ2g ε′(
g
1+g
+ ε′
)
(1 + g)
>
ℓ− 1+g
g+ℓ
gε′ − 4(1+g)
ℓ
λ
ε′
g + (1 + g)ε′
>
3
4
ℓ
3
2
g
>
ℓ
2g
.
The first inequality follows from δ = g
1+g
+ε′ > g
1+g
. The third inequality is ensured by ε′ < 2ε7
and λ < λ. Therefore, we have obtained ℓ
2g
< −
βi,3−βi,2
βi,2−βi,1
< 1 and βi,3 ∈ (βi,2, βi,2). That is,8
βi,3 − βi,2 > 0.9
Next, let us derive −
βi,t+3−βi,t+2
βi,t+2−βi,t+1
inductively. Suppose that ℓ
2g
< −
βi,s+2−βi,s+1
βi,s+1−βi,s
< 1 and10
βi,s+2 ∈ (min {βi,s, βi,s+1} ,max {βi,s, βi,s+1}) hold for period s = 1, 2, . . . , t. We have shown11
that this supposition holds for t = 1. We show that ℓ
2g
< −
βi,t+3−βi,t+2
βi,t+2−βi,t+1
< 1 and βi,t+3 ∈12
(min {βi,t+1, βi,t+2} ,max {βi,t+1, βi,t+2}) hold.13
By (3) for t+ 1 and t+ 2, we have14 {
λ
δ(1−βi,t)
= −(1− βi,t+1)g − βi,t+1ℓ+ δ(1− βi,t+1)(1− βi,t+2)(1 + g),
λ
δ(1−βi,t+1)
= −(1− βi,t+2)g − βi,t+2ℓ+ δ(1− βi,t+2)(1− βi,t+3)(1 + g),
or,15
−
βi,t+1 − βi,t
δ(1− βi,t)(1− βi,t+1)
λ
=− (βi,t+2 − βi,t+1)(g − ℓ) + δ(1− βi,t+2) {(βi,t+3 − βi,t+2) + (βi,t+2 − βi,t+1)} (1 + g).
The suppositions ensure βi,t+2 − βi,t+1 ̸= 0. Divide both sides of the above equation by16
βi,t+2 − βi,t+1. Then, we obtain17
−
βi,t+3 − βi,t+2
βi,t+2 − βi,t+1
=
ℓ+ δ(1 + g)(1− βi,t+2)− g +
1
δ(1−βi,t)(1−βi,t+1)
βi,t+2−βi,t+1
βi,t+1−βi,t
λ
δ(1 + g)(1− βi,t+2)
.
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As Assumption 3 and
βi,t+2−βi,t+1
βi,t+1−βi,t
< 0 hold, −
βi,t+3−βi,t+2
βi,t+2−βi,t+1
is bounded above by1
−
βi,t+3 − βi,t+2
βi,t+2 − βi,t+1
≤
δ(1 + g)(1− βi,t+2) +
1
δ(1−βi,t)(1−βi,t+1)
βi,t+2−βi,t+1
βi,t+1−βi,t
λ
δ(1 + g)(1− βi,t+2)
< 1.
Taking 0 < βi,t+1, βi,t+2 <
1+g+ℓ
g+ℓ
ε′ = βi,1, and
ℓ
2g
< −
βi,t+2−βi,t+1
βi,t+1−βi,t
< 1 into account, we find2
the following lower bound of −
βi,t+3−βi,t+2
βi,t+2−βi,t+1
.3
−
βi,t+3 − βi,t+2
βi,t+2 − βi,t+1
=
ℓ+ δ(1− βi,t+2)(1 + g)− g +
1
δ(1−βi,t)(1−βi,t+1)
βi,t+2−βi,t+1
βi,t+1−βi,t
λ
δ(1 + g)(1− βi,t+2)
>
ℓ+ g
(
1− 1+g+ℓ
g+ℓ
ε′
)
− g − 1
( g1+g+ε′)(1−
1+g+ℓ
g+ℓ
ε′)
2 2g
ℓ
λ(
g
1+g
+ ε′
)
(1 + g)
>
ℓ− 1+g+ℓ
g+ℓ
gε′ − 1g
1+g
· 1
4
·2
ε′
g + (1 + g)ε′
>
3
4
ℓ
3
2
g
>
ℓ
2g
.
Therefore, we obtain ℓ
2g
< −
βi,t+3−βi,t+2
βi,t+2−βi,t+1
< 1 and4
βi,t+3 ∈ (min {βi,t+1, βi,t+2} ,max {βi,t+1, βi,t+2}).5
C Proof of Theorem 16
Proof. Let us fix n such that:7
n ≥
4 + 2g
ε
.
We use the same technique as in Lemma 2. We divide the repeated game into n distinct8
repeated games. The first repeated game is played in period 1, n+ 1, 2n+ 1 . . . , the second9
repeated game is played in period 2, n + 1, 2n + 2 . . . , and so on. Each repeated game can10
be regarded as a repeated game with discount factor δn.11
We can find a sequential equilibrium strategy σˆ∗ whose payoff vector vˆ∗ = (v∗1, v
∗
2) satisfies12
|vˆ∗i − 1| <
1
n
when discount factor δn is sufficiently large by Proposition 3. By Corollary 4.2,13
there exists a sequential equilibrium strategy σˆ∗∗ whose payoff vector vˆ∗∗ = (v∗∗1 , v
∗∗
2 ) satisfies14
vˆ∗∗1 = 0 and
∣∣vˆ∗∗2 − 1+g+ℓ1+ℓ ∣∣ < 1n when discount factor δn is sufficiently large.15
Let us assume that vF1 ≤ v
F
2 . We choose sufficiently large discount factor δ so that we16
can use Proposition 4 and Corollary 4.2, and the discount factor δ satisfies the following17
condition:18
1− δ
1− δn
≤
2
n
.
The desired payoff vector v can be expressed uniquely as a convex combination of vˆ∗, vˆ∗∗19
and (0, 0) with some α1, α2 ∈ (0, 1) as below.20
v = α1δvˆ
∗ + α2δvˆ
∗∗ + (1− α1 − α2) · 0.
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(1, 1)
(−ℓ, 1 + g)
(1 + g,−ℓ)
(0, 0)
(
0, 1+g+ℓ
1+ℓ
)
(
1+g+ℓ
1+ℓ
, 0
)
vF
vˆ∗∗
vˆ∗
Figure 4: vF , vˆ∗, vˆ∗∗
Let us define n1 and n2 as follows.1
n1 ≡ argmin
n∈N∪{0}
∣∣∣∣1− δn1− δn − α1
∣∣∣∣ , n2 ≡ argmin
n∈N∪{0}
∣∣∣∣δn1 − δn1+n1− δn − α2
∣∣∣∣ .
Then, n1 and n2 satisfy2 ∣∣∣∣1− δn11− δn − α1
∣∣∣∣ ≤
(
1− δ
1− δn
≤
)
2
n
,
∣∣∣∣δn1 − δn1+n21− δn − α2
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2n.
Let us consider the following strategy σF . In the first n1-th games, players play strat-3
egy σˆ∗. From the n1 + 1-th game to the n1 + n2-th game, players play strategy σˆ
∗∗. From4
the n1 + n2 + 1-th to n-th game, players play the stage game Nash equilibrium repetitively.5
It is straightforward that the strategy σF is a sequential equilibrium.6
The payoff vFi for player i is given by7
vFi =
(1− δn1)vˆ∗i + (δ
n1 − δn1+n2)vˆ∗∗i + (δ
n1+n2 − δn) · 0
1− δn
.
Therefore, we have8
∣∣vFi − v∣∣ <
∣∣∣∣1− δn11− δn vˆ∗i − α1vˆ∗i
∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣δn1 − δn1+n21− δn vˆ∗∗i − α2 · v∗∗i
∣∣∣∣+ 0
<
2
n
· 1 +
2
n
· (1 + g) =
4 + 2g
n
< ε.
We obtain that the payoff vector v can be approximated by a sequential equilibrium payoff9
vector when v1 ≤ v2 holds.10
By symmetricity of the payoff matrix, it is straightforward that the payoff vector v can11
be approximated by a sequential equilibrium payoff vector when v1 ≥ v2 also holds.12
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